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ABSTRACT: In a production structure reasonable for a developing economy this note shows that there 
may arise a conflict between the worldwide liberalized trade policies in agriculture, which raise the price of 
the economy’s primary exportable commodity, and the inflow of foreign capital into the economy. 
However, if the economy strictly adheres to the different facets of the agricultural trade liberalization 
policies, e.g. the removal of the indirect farm subsidies, the paper argues that the possible conflict may be 
avoided. The paper provides a theoretical basis for the removal of the farm subsidies if the economy wants 
to develop its technologically more advanced sectors with an adequate supply of foreign capital. 
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DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY AND GLOBAL TRADE 
LIBERALIZATION IN AGRICULTURE: A NOTE. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION: 
 
Foreign capital plays a prominent role in the development of developing countries. The inflow of foreign 
capital not only can help in lessening the scarcity of domestic capital but also can help in transferring 
improved technology of production to the host countries, boosting up of the economy’s export growth and 
hence improving the balance-of-payments position and generating additional employment opportunities 
utilizing the hitherto untapped local resources. Of the different types of foreign capital our focus in this 
paper will be on the foreign direct investment (FDI), which is generally sector-specific in nature. 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) are no benevolent institutions. They invest only with an eye to the 
profitability of investment in the sector in which they plan to invest. Naturally they are interested to invest 
in the technologically advanced sectors with high profitability. Several studies have pointed out that over 
the last decade or so the FDI investment to developing countries has increased considerably.  
 
The multilateral agreement and the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), resultant of the 
Uruguay round of discussions, have brought about revolutionary changes in liberalizing international trade 
across countries whether developed or developing. Radical measures for reducing tariff barriers and 
completely doing away with non-tariff barriers to ensure freer global trade have already been undertaken in 
manufacturing commodities that are intensive in the use of capital or skilled labour. However, the attempt 
to subject agricultural commodities to disciplines similar to those that govern trade in manufactures has not 
so far been successful. Moreover, in agriculture, exports from developing countries remain severely 
hampered by massive domestic support and export subsidy programs in developed countries, by peak tariffs 
and difficulties in the implementation of the tariff quota system (UNCTAD, 1999, p 41). 
 
The possibility of a conflict between tariff reforms in manufactures and the attraction of foreign capital in a 
developing economy is inevitable. It has been observed that some developing countries, notably the non-
OECD countries, are relatively slow in carrying out tariff reforms compared to other countries, although 
they have opted for the policy of free trade as their development strategy and have been able to attract 
substantial amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) during the last decade. The explanation is provided 
by the tariff-jumping theory
1 that suggests a positive correlation between the amount of FDI in a country 
and the tariff rate imposed by it. There is no doubt that the major driving force behind FDI by the 
multinational corporations (MNCs) in the developing countries is the higher rate of return on their capital 
in these countries vis-à-vis the international market. Countries with protected domestic markets are likely to 
                                                           
1 See for example, Motta (1992) and Yanagawa (1990) for details.   3 
attract foreign investment
2, but only for the purpose of jumping the tariff walls and reaping a good harvest 
by serving their markets directly. On the contrary, reductions of import tariffs imply larger volumes of 
imports, lower rates of return to capital and smaller amounts of FDI in these countries. The tariff-jumping 
argument is valid only if foreign capital enters into the import-competing sector of the host country. On the 
contrary, Chaudhuri and Mukherjee (2002) show that the positive correlation between tariff rates and 
foreign capital flows prevails even if foreign capital comes into the export sector of a developing economy 
and thus explain why some developing countries implement tariff reforms very slowly compared to others, 
even after formally choosing free trade as their development strategies, in a more general fashion than the 
existing tariff-jumping theory.  
 
The WTO is now embarking upon a new round of negotiations on agricultural trade. Multilateral 
liberalization in the context of WTO negotiations will primarily imply reduced protection of agriculture 
where the rates of protection are highest, i.e. in developed countries. It will imply reduced protection 
against imports and reduced subsidies for domestic production, including reduced export subsidies. A new 
agreement may impose limitations on these policies and on the introduction of new protectionist policies in 
other developing countries. As multilateral liberalization in agriculture following the Uruguay round has 
been limited in scope and is still being phased in, there is not yet much direct evidence available to judge 
empirically the consequences of such liberalization (see Haug and  Øygard 1999). However, if the result of 
reduced trade barriers and increased international competition are uniform in both developed or developing 
countries, the prices of the primary agricultural exports of the developing countries are likely to rise 
because of the probable reduction of the multilateral tariffs by the large trading countries and increase in 
their import demands.  Model simulations of multilateral trade liberalization, e.g. (Hoekman and Anderson, 
1999) are quite unanimous in predicting that such a liberalization would result in higher world market 
prices than otherwise for those goods currently being protected and subsidised.  
 
 The present paper explores the possibility of a conflict between multilateral trade liberalization programs 
in agriculture and FDI in a developing economy in a general equilibrium set-up. It shows that a small open 
economy, which is capital scarce and willing to attract foreign capital in the desired sectors, cannot 
continue with the policy of subsidization of the major agricultural inputs. In a production structure 
reasonable for a developing economy, the paper shows that the worldwide liberalized trade policies in 
agriculture that raise the price of the economy’s primary exportable commodity may lower the rate of 
return on foreign capital employed in the other sector (s) of the economy thereby reducing the incentives of 
the foreign investors to invest in those sectors. Therefore, there may arise a conflict between trade 
                                                           
2 Although the supply of foreign capital in an economy is positively related to the rate of return to capital in 
the host country the actual amount of foreign capital that is allowed to go into a developing economy in 
many cases is directly regulated by its government. In the process of liberalization the governments of these 
countries are allowing more and more foreign capital to enter into their economies. See Marjit (1994) in 
this context.   4 
liberalization in agriculture and the inflow of foreign capital in a developing economy. However, if the 
developing countries strictly adhere to the different facets of the agricultural trade liberalization policies, 
e.g. removal of the indirect farm subsidies, the paper argues that the possible conflict may be avoided. The 
paper, therefore, provides a theoretical basis for the removal of farm subsidies
3 if the economy wants to 
develop its technologically more advanced sectors with an adequate supply of foreign capital.                  
 
2.  THE MODEL:  
 
We consider a small open monetised economy consisting of three sectors. Sector 1 produces a primary 
agricultural product using labour and fertilizer. Sector 2 produces a specialized manufacturing product with 
the help of labour and foreign capital. Sector 3 is the traditional manufacturing sector, which produces its 
output using labour and domestic capital. So foreign capital is specific to sector 2 and domestic capital is a 
specific input in sector 3. However, labour is mobile among all the three sectors of the economy. Fertilizer 
used in the production of sector 1 is entirely imported at a price given internationally and supplied to the 
producers at a subsidized price. Owing to our small open economy assumption we consider all the three 
product prices to be given internationally. The economy described above roughly resembles a less 
developed country. Production functions exhibit constant returns to scale with diminishing marginal 
productivity to each factor, resources are fully utilized and markets are competitive. We assume that the 
economy exports commodities 1 and 2 and is a net importer of the traditional manufacturing product – 
commodity 3. Finally, the import-competing sector is protected by a tariff.   
 
The following symbols will be used in the equations. 
Xi = level of production of the ith sector, i = 1,2,3; 
aKi = capital-output ratio in the ith sector, i = 2,3; 
aLi = labour-output ratio in the ith sector, i = 1,2,3; 
aF1 = fertilizer-output ratio in sector 1; 
Pi = world price of the ith good, i = 1,2,3; 
PF = world price of fertilizer; 
S = ad-valorem rate of subsidy on fertilizer; 
PF* = PF.(1-S) = the effective price of fertilizer to the producers of sector 1; 
T = ad-valorem rate of tariff on the import of good 3; 
P3* = P3.(1+T) = tariff-inclusive or domestic price of commodity 3; 
W = wage rate of labour;  
RF = return to foreign capital; 
RD = return to domestic capital; 
                                                           
3 The major categories of agricultural subsidies are fertilizer, food, power, credit and irrigation. These 
subsidies not only put a heavy burden on the exchequer but also bring down an economy’s welfare by   5 
L = fixed amount of supply of labour;  
KD = fixed stock of domestic capital; 
KF = supply of foreign capital. 
 
We assume that the supply of foreign capital, KF is a rising function of the rate of return to capital in sector 
2. This is because foreign capital would enter into the relevant industry of the economy only if its rate of 
return in this sector is higher than that prevailing in the international market. The higher the rate of return, 
the larger will be the amount of foreign capital entering the economy.
4 So we have 
KF = KF(RF); KF′(.) > 0.                                      (1) 
 
A general equilibrium of the system is represented by the following set of equations: 
W.aL1 + PF*.aF1 = P1                                    (2) 
W.aL2 + RF.aK2 = P2                                     (3) 
W.aL3 + RD.aK3 = P3                                     (4) 
aL1.X1 + aL2.X2 + aL3.X3 = L                        (5) 
aK2.X2 = KF(RF)                                           (6) 
aK3.X3 = KD                                                  (7) 
 
Equations (2) − (4) are the zero profitability conditions for the three sectors of the economy. On the other 
hand, equations (5) − (7) are the full-employment conditions of the three factors of production: labour, 
foreign capital and domestic capital. 
 
We have seven equations (1 – 7) to solve for seven unknowns – W, RF, RD, X1, X2, X3 and KF. The system 
possesses the decomposition property. The three factor prices are determined from equations (2–4), 
independently of factor endowments. Once the factor prices are known factor coefficients are also known. 
X1, X2 and X3 are then found from equations (5 – 7). Finally, KF is obtained from equation (1) when RF is 
known.  
 
2.1   Comparative Statics                       
 
To study the effects of a change in P1 (or S) (or T) on the factor prices, the supply of foreign capital into the 
economy and the product-mix, after totally differentiating equations (2) – (4) we get 
θL1.W ˆ  =  1 ˆ P  − θF1.
* ˆ
F P                      (2.1) 
θL2.W ˆ  + θK2.  F R ˆ  = 0                        (3.1) 
                                                                                                                                                                              
distorting the domestic prices of agricultural commodities.   6 
θL3.W ˆ  + θK3.  D R ˆ  = 
*
3 ˆ P                     (4.1)  
where θij denotes the distributive share of the j
th factor in the ith industry for j = L, KF, KD, F; i = 1,2,3 and 
“ ^ ” denotes a proportional change (see Jones (1965)). 
Solving (2.1) – (4.1) by Cramer’s rule we get the following. 
W ˆ  = (1/∆).[θK2.θK3. ( 1 ˆ P  − θF1.
* ˆ
F P )]                                 (8.1) 
F R ˆ  = − (1/∆).[θL2.θK3. ( 1 ˆ P  − θF1.
* ˆ
F P )]                               (8.2) 
D R ˆ  = (1/∆).[θL1.θK2.P3* − θK2.θL3. ( 1 ˆ P  − θF1.
* ˆ
F P )]            (8.3) 
where  ∆ = θL1.θK2.θK3  >  0. 
 
2.1.1   An increase in the price of the primary exportable commodity 
 
In the regime of liberalized international trade and investment regime the prices of primary agricultural 
exports of the developing countries are expected to rise possibly owing to the multilateral tariff reductions 
by the large trading countries and the consequent increase in their import demands. It is easy to check from 
equations (8.1) – (8.3) that an increase in the price of the primary agricultural product, P1, ceteris paribus, 
raises W but lowers both RF and RD. Actually as W rises following an increase in P1, RF falls to satisfy the 
zero profitability condition in the specialized manufacturing sector. This lowers the inflow of foreign 
capital in the economy since it is positively related to the rate of return, RF. So we have the following 
proposition. 
PROPOSITION 1: An increase in the price of the primary agricultural exportable commodity lowers the 
supply of foreign capital to the host country. 
 
Using  (8.1) and (8.2) from equation (6) one can derive 
2 ˆ X  = − (θL2.θK3/∆).(E + σ2).( 1 ˆ P  − θF1.
* ˆ
F P )                         (9) 
where E = (KF′ (.).RF / KF(.)) is the elasticity of supply of foreign capital with respect to its rate of return in 
the host country and E > 0. 
From (9), it follows that  2 ˆ X  < 0 when  1 ˆ P  > 0. It should be noted that sector 2 contracts even when the 
supply of foreign capital is absolutely insensitive to its rate of return, RF. This leads to the following 
proposition. 
PROPOSITION 2:  An increase in the price of the primary agricultural product reduces the level of 
production of the specialized manufacturing product. The latter sector contracts even if the inflow of 
foreign capital is independent of its rate of return.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
4 See in this context, Datta Chaudhuri and Adhikari (1993) and Gupta (1994), who have also made this 
assumption but in a different context.).     7 
2.1.2   A Reduction in Fertilizer Subsidy 
 
Trade liberalization in agriculture includes a gradual abolition of all direct and indirect farm subsidies. In 
the developing countries, producers in the agricultural sector get several essential inputs like fertilizer at 
highly subsidized prices. If the rate of fertilizer subsidy is reduced, ceteris paribus, S ˆ  < 0 but  1 ˆ P , T ˆ  = 0. 
Since 
* ˆ
F P  = − (S/(1−S)).S ˆ , from (8.2) we can write 
F R ˆ  = − (1/∆).[θL2.θK3.θF1. (S/(1−S))].S ˆ   >  0 if  S ˆ   <  0                                       (8.2.1) 
From equation (1) it then follows that KF increases if S decreases. From (9) it now follows that 
2 ˆ X = − (θL2.θK3/∆).(E + σ2). (S/(1−S))].S ˆ   >  0 if  S ˆ   <  0                                       (9.1)  
So we have the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 3: A reduction in fertilizer subsidy (i) raises the return to foreign capital, (ii) raises the 
supply of foreign capital in the economy, and, (iii) leads to an expansion of the specialized manufacturing 
sector.  
 
The intuitive explanation of the above results is fairly straightforward. A reduction in the rate of fertilizer 
subsidy pushes up the effective price of fertilizer to the producers. To satisfy the zero profit condition in the 
rural sector, the wage rate of labour, W has to fall. As W falls the rate of return to foreign capital, RF rises to 
satisfy the zero profitability condition in sector 2, which in turn raises the supply of foreign capital into the 
economy, KF. The producers in sector 2 will now adopt a less capital-intensive technique of production, 
which lowers the capital-output ration, aK2 since W has fallen and RF has increased. A decrease in aK2 and 
an increase in KF ensure an expansion of the specialized manufacturing sector. 
 
2.1.3  Combined Effects of Reduction of Fertilizer Subsidy and Increase in Agricultural Price 
 
If the world price of the agricultural product increases and the ad-valorem subsidy rate of fertilizer 
decreases simultaneously we would have  1 ˆ P  > 0 and S ˆ  < 0. It is worthwhile to mention that our small 
open economy cannot control P1 but S is its policy variable that can be manipulated according to the rate of 
increase in the agricultural price. 
We consider the case where S ˆ  = − β. 1 ˆ P ; β > 0.                            (10) 
Since PF* = PF.(1−S), it follows that 
* ˆ
F P = − (S/(1−S)).S ˆ  = (S/(1−S)).β. 1 ˆ P . Hence, 
( 1 ˆ P  − θF1.
* ˆ
F P ) = { 1 ˆ P .[1 – S.(1+β.θF1] / (1−S)}                               (11) 
Using (11) from (8.2) and (9) we respectively get   8 
F R ˆ  = − (1/∆).[θL2.θK3.{  1 ˆ P .[1 – S.(1+β.θF1] / (1−S)}]                               (8.2.2) 
2 ˆ X  = − (θL2.θK3/∆).(E + σ2).{ 1 ˆ P .[1 – S.(1+β.θF1] / (1−S)}]                      (9.2)           
From (8.2.2) and (9.2) it follows that 
F R ˆ ,  2 ˆ X   > (=) (<) 0 iff  ((1− S) / S.θF1) < (=) (>) β. 
An increase in P1 lowers both RF and X2. On the contrary, a reduction in fertilizer subsidy S raises them. 
When  S ˆ  = − β. 1 ˆ P ; β > 0, the combined effect would be an increase in both RF and X2 if and only if β >  
((1− S) / S.θF1). We are now interested in constructing a benchmark case where P1 and S both change in the 
same proportion but in the different direction. So if  β = 1,  F R ˆ ,  2 ˆ X   > (=) (<) 0 if and only if   SC < (=) 
(>) S where SC is the critical value of the ad-valorem rate of subsidy on fertilizer and SC = {1/(1 + θF1)}. 
This leads to the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 4: An increase in the price of the agricultural product accompanied by a reduction in 
fertilizer subsidy, (i) raises the rate of return to foreign capital, (ii) raises the supply of foreign capital in the 
economy, and, (iii) leads to an expansion of the specialized manufacturing sector iff  β  >  ((1− S) / S.θF1). 
In the benchmark case when β = 1, the above results hold iff  S > SC = {1/(1 + θF1)}. 
 
From (8.2) and (8.3) it is evident that any change in rate of tariff imposed on the import-competing sector 
affects only RD and hence cannot affect the inflow of foreign capital. However, if foreign capital were 
employed in the import-competing sector of the economy, a reduction in the tariff rate would have reduced 
the supply of foreign capital into the economy by lowering its rate of return.  
 
3.  CONCLUDING REMARKS: 
 
This paper in terms of a three sector full employment general equilibrium model has examined the 
possibility of raising a conflict between the global trade liberalization policy in agriculture and the inflow 
of foreign capital in a small open economy. The liberalized trade policy in agriculture, if followed by the 
large trading countries, is bound to raise the prices of the primary agricultural products, which in turn may 
lower the rate of return on foreign capital in a small open economy leading to a fall in the foreign capital 
inflow. This will seriously hamper the growth of the modern manufacturing sectors in the developing 
countries that relies on foreign capital inflow and technology. However, the paper points out that this 
possible conflict in the sphere of a small open economy may be avoided by withdrawal of the direct and 
indirect farm subsidies in the agricultural sector. 
 
Even if a small open economy does not resort to liberalized trade measures external forces like an increase 
in the price of the primary agricultural commodity leads to a fall in the foreign capital inflow resulting in a 
contraction of its manufacturing sector, which relies heavily on the supply of foreign capital. We have   9 
shown that this untoward effect on the economy may be prevented by bringing down/ doing away with 
agricultural subsidies. In the process, the heavy burden on the exchequer and the money value of the loss of 
aggregate welfare resulting from price distortions owing to subsidies would be lessened too. The paper, 
thus, provides a theoretical basis for the removal of farm subsidies if the economy wants to develop its 
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